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The ancient idea of philosophy as a kind of therapy, although somewhat neglected in 
mainstream philosophy, seems to be enjoying a new renaissance. A very good example is 
Philosophy as Therapeia, edited by Jonardon Ganeri and Clare Carlisle. The first point 
that is noticeable about this volume is its exceptionally wide scope. In addition to 
philosophical currents commonly recognized as therapeutic, the book investigates ones 
rarely treated as such. It contains not only chapters on ancient philosophy and 
Wittgenstein, but ones devoted to the philosophies of Spinoza, Nietzsche, and James, and 
to Buddhism and Patañjali’s Yoga. Some of the contributions make revealing 
comparisons between Western and Eastern philosophies. The philosophies of ancient 
Greece, the Hellenistic world, Socrates, and Thomas Aquinas are fruitfully compared 
with the philosophies of India, Buddhism, Rāmānuja, and Brahmanical systems. 
 
The exceptionally wide scope of the volume, however, is not its most important 
feature. The conception of philosophy as therapy has often been applied in an 
insufficiently rigorous way. Too often, it has remained an obscure metaphor. It is in this 
context that the importance of Philosophy as Therapeia is most evident. One of the 
editors’ intentions is to provide ‘a thorough examination both of the scope and of the 
limits of the medical model’ (2). It is this kind of explicit examination that is lacking in 
earlier literature on therapeutic philosophy, including the groundbreaking accounts by 
Hadot and Foucault. (Nussbaum’s discussion of a therapeutic argument is a notable 
exception.) 
 
Before we can delineate ‘the scope and…the limits of the medical model’, the 
features of this model must be specified. Ganeri’s analysis of ancient Indian thought 
suggests that it has ‘four constituents’ (7): 1) a disease, 2) a cause of the disease, 3) a 
cure, and 4) a state of health resulting from successful therapy. Philosophical therapeia, 
accordingly, involves ‘an account of what is sought to be removed or eliminated…an 
account of its aetiology…an account of the state or condition achieved subsequent to this 
elimination…and finally an account of the method to be employed to bring this condition 
about’ (122). 
 
The attempt to specify the therapeutic model is indeed very rare. Even rarer, 
however, is the effort to delineate this model’s limitations made by Gowans. This 
contributor, in particular, although well aware of the ‘obvious attractions’ (33) of the 
medical model to what he calls ‘tranquility philosophies’, offers a serious discussion of 
this model’s difficulties, including ‘significant disanalogies between medical practice and 
physical health on the one hand, and philosophy and psychological health…on the other’ 
(12). These difficulties and ‘significant disanalogies’ can be summarized as resulting 
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from the following: the philosophical account of psychological well-being (health) which 
involves the elimination of emotional life and which, as such, is alien to most of lay and 
medical (and, in fact, philosophical) common sense; a normative position which is not 
only itself questionable, but whose positive formulation (as centered around virtue) is 
incompatible with the medical conceptual framework; the overemphasis on the role of 
belief modification—hardly understandable within the field of somatic medicine. 
 
After specifying the therapeutic analogy the book begins its investigation of 
particular philosophical therapies. The individual chapters, a bit surprisingly, do not seem 
to exhibit any particular order or organization. That said, an organization can be very 
easily imposed utilizing Ganeri’s four constituents. And although the resulting order, 
which I follow below, is not identical to the one actually used in the volume, it still seems 
to be a comprehensible, useful way of conveying the latter’s merits.  
  
 1, 2) The disease and its cause. A more or less explicit and systematic account of 
what is supposed to be removed or eliminated can be found in any philosophical therapy, 
and each of the book’s chapters provides an account of this. The contributions of 
Gunnarsson and Burton particularly deserve mention here. The former, which 
investigates the young William James, can be read in the context of the fact that the 
therapeutic analogy places philosophy closely, some may say dangerously closely, to 
psychotherapy. Gunnarsson, more specifically, goes to considerable length to show that 
the diseases treated by philosophy are not primarily psychological or psychiatric in kind. 
Rather, they are philosophical crises ‘with a psychological dimension’ (168). In order to 
substantiate this kind of insight, he discusses the example of philosophical melancholy as 
something distinct from ‘any psychiatric disorder’ (8) and as constituted by a) the belief 
that ‘life is not worth living’, b) specific emotional states such as Weltschmerz or a 
feeling of uncanniness, and c) the tendency to commit suicide. In the case of the young 
James, this specifically philosophical existential condition was ‘fed by too much 
reflection’ (178). It arose, in particular, from the theoretical difficulties connected with 
belief in free will. 
  
The chapter by Burton is devoted to Buddhism. Its particularly notable feature is 
the effort it makes precisely to delineate the scope of affective and motivational 
phenomena which should be removed by the successful therapeutic endeavor. The author 
attempts, more specifically, to correct ‘a popular misconception’ (193) that Buddhism 
aims at the removal of all desires and emotions. In order to achieve this goal he draws 
several clear-cut distinctions between affective processes which are considered 
unwholesome (akusala) and those treated as wholesome (kusala). His careful corrective 
work, in fact, seems itself to be therapeutic. 
  
 3) The cure. Among individual species of philosophical therapeia there is a wide 
variety of procedures designed to cure the philosophical disease. The examples of such 
techniques can be found in any of this volume’s chapters, and at times they are 
scrutinized in a considerable detail (see especially the numerous distinctions drawn in the 
Soni’s chapter on Yoga). It is both impossible and unnecessary, however, to review all of 
them here. Instead, some interesting general and formal points made can be highlighted. 
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First, then, we can consider the question how best to envision the practice of 
philosophical therapy. Ganeri discusses the ancient images of the philosopher as a 
sculptor of his own self (Plotinus), and as a weaver of his own life (Plutarch). What is 
important is that these pieces of imagery determine two distinct ‘interpretations of the 
spiritual exercises’ (126) and consequently of the philosophical therapeia they constitute. 
The image of a sculptor suggests that exercises in question are ‘restorative, returning the 
person to a state…from which they have departed’ (126). The image of the weaver, on 
the other hand, refers to an activity that is ‘generative, producing in the person the 
condition…that had not been there before’ (126). 
  
It is in the context of these two images that some remarks made in the Hampe’s 
chapter on Spinoza can be read. Hampe discusses the Aristotelian distinction between 
technical and practical knowledge and the Spinozian critique of the technical approach to 
one’s own life. Both sculpting and weaving, importantly, are technai in which a product 
can be distinguished from the activity producing it. The pursuit of philosophical therapy, 
on the other hand, is usually depicted as the one in which the means applied (virtus) 
cannot be separated from the results obtained (eudaimonia, beatitudo). 
  
 4) The state of health. Any therapeutic endeavor is directed at health. Being 
aware of this, one may be a bit surprised by the fact that Philosophy as Therapeia has 
much more to say about the state of the philosophical illness than about the goal it 
pursues. Why is it the case? One possible explanation is that health should be understood 
in purely negative terms, i.e. as nothing more than the lack of the illness. This suggestion 
can be supported by Gowan’s thesis that the medical model is ‘better suited’ (28) to that 
part of living well that is constituted by tranquility than it is to the part constituted by 
virtue. Importantly, this thesis seems to entail that it is the negative notion of 
philosophical health (i.e., tranquility as the lack of negative emotional phenomena) rather 
than its positive counterpart (i.e., virtue) that naturally suits the therapeutic analogy. 
  
 Conclusions. The short and necessarily selective sample of the issues from 
Philosophy as Therapeia provided here is representative of the volume’s contents and 
merits. It illustrates the way in which the medical model helps to organize the 
heterogeneous domain of philosophical therapeia. 
  
Two of the main and obvious virtues of the book are its wide scope and the 
consistent depth of discussion of the nature of therapeutic thinking. Not only do the 
contributors investigate figures rarely thought of as proposing philosophical therapy, they 
also discuss what exactly attribution of the term ‘philosophical therapeia’ means in 
various different cases, and what is entailed in the subsequent analyses. These advantages 
cannot be easily overestimated. 
  
Having granted this, I have two suggestions for further development of the 
account developed in the book. The first refers to the meta-therapeutic model proposed 
by Ganeri, which might be interestingly enriched if the ‘four constituents’ were 
supplemented by other elements of philosophical therapy’s structure. The addition of the 
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philosophical physician-patient relationship, for example, could help to more clearly 
situate within the model the chapter by Wharton, in which Brahmanical and Socratic 
pedagogies, with their non-negligible interpersonal aspects, are examined. 
  
My second remark concerns the relatively small number of references to modern 
psychotherapy and literature, domains in which can sometimes be found very creative 
focus on the idea of philosophical therapy. Irvin Yalom’s application of Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer, as well as Goce Smilevski’s application of Spinoza, seem to be very good 
examples here. 
  
It should be emphasized, however, that these suggestions for improvement 
concern a volume that is nonetheless exceptional in terms of both its scope and quality. 
Philosophy as Therapeia is a highly commendable review and introduction to the 
fascinating domain of philosophical therapy. 
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